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Resumo Emails de Phishing são um tipo de ataque comum na internet que resultam
no roubo de informação confidencial de utilizadores como contas bancárias,
dados privados, logins pessoais ou de identidade. O objetivo desta tese de
mestrado passou por desenvolver uma ferramenta inteligente baseada em
abordagens com aprendizagem automática para filtrar este tipo de emails ma-
lignos. O projeto foi feito em cooperação com a E-goi, empresa de automação
de marketing multicanal. A primeira etapa do projeto foi a de selecionar as-
pectos característicos dos emails de modo a poder diferenciar entre emails de
phishing e normais. O conjunto final destas características foi escolhido de-
pois de um estudo minucioso da literatura e das necessidades da empresa.
O passo seguinte foi a escolha de um algoritmo eficiente para a deteção de
emails de phishing. Como a tarefa foi considerada um problema de classifi-
cação, vários algoritmos de aprendizagem automática foram testados (SVM,
DT, Random Forest, Boosted Trees). Um grande desafio que foi deparado
durante o desenvolvimento foi o da falta de dados categorizados, mais espe-
cificamente do tipo de phishing. Para tentar contornar o problema, o sistema
de detação de phishing foi construído com ajuda de dados (emails) publica-
mente disponíveis. De modo a facilitar a implementação de um protótipo na
empresa E-goi, foi desenvolvida uma ferramenta web para categorizar a cole-
cionar emails. Este sistema permite a pessoal autorizado da empresa a fazer
a categorização on-line de emails adquiridos.

Keywords phishing emails, machine learning, feature selection, random forest.
Abstract Phishing emails are a very common attack on the web, that results in the theft
of confidential user information such as bank accounts, private data, personal
logins or of identity. The goal of this master thesis was to develop intelligent
tools to filter out the emails with such malign intent, based on machine learn-
ing approaches. The work was done in close collaboration with a multichannel
marketing automation company of name E-goi. The first stage of the project
was to select appropriate features able to discriminate between ordinary and
phishing emails. The final feature set was chosen after a comprehensive study
of the literature and the particular needs of the involved company. The next
step was to choose an efficient algorithm for phishing emails detection. Since
this task was considered as a classification problem, a number of machine
learning classifiers were tested (SVM, DT, Random Forest). A major chal-
lenge during development was the lack of sufficient labeled data, particularly
regarding the class of phishing emails. To get around this, the phishing detec-
tion system was built based on a collection of samples (emails) from different
publicly available data sets. In order to facilitate the implementation of the
phishing detection prototype in the company E-goi, a web tool was developed
to create a home-made labeled data set of emails. This system allows autho-
rized company personnel to label on-line each obtained email.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Phishing emails are a common attack on the web that results in the theft of confidential
user information such as bank accounts, private data, personal logins or identity. These
attacks have a heavy impact on the web and on the global economy, as billions of dollars
are reported stolen every year.
Finding an automatic solution for this problem is a difficult task because phishers are
very creative, and often it is hard even for a human to differentiate between legitimate
and malign content. Many of the existent techniques rely on available and regularly
updated black Uniform Resource Locator (URL) lists to filter out harmful messages.
Others use knowledge obtained from past attacks to create empirical rules that decide
if a new mail is phishing or not. Over the last years machine learning algorithms have
been gaining popularity as a mechanism to find hidden relationships between the emails.
The objective of this thesis was to develop an intelligent tool for phishing detection,
based on the principles of machine learning, suitable for implementation in the multi-
channel marketing automation company E-goi. The system was intended to work as a
filtering mechanism to help deal with the high amounts of emails that the company
receives daily. The goal was to reduce the amount time spent by workers that had to
go through hundreds of emails everyday to verify their authenticity, when only a small
portion would actually need to be flagged as phishing.
A major issue was the lack of labeled dataset. This was because no previous attacks
were saved, and new phishing attempts were scarce and mixed with the legitimate
emails. Hence, an additional objective (not envisaged at the beginning of the project)
was defined, namely to develop a suitable web service to label the incoming emails, and
therefore create a sufficiently large dataset to allow a reliable study to be done.
The content of this document is organized in the following chapters. In Chapter
1 the motivation and the objectives of this work are outlined. Overview of phishing
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detection principles and related works is done in Chapter 2. The proposed solution is
described in Chapter 3. It has three main stages. The first one is the creation of a
reliable dataset with similar characteristics as the email structure and content of the
company‘s clients. The second stage is the extraction of the most reliable features to
discriminate between regular and phishing emails. Two approaches are followed: i)
Binary features (0 or 1) - often suggested in the revised phishing detection literature; ii)
Bag of words - more typical features in the text mining context. The third stage is the
search for an efficient algorithm for phishing detection among well known supervised
learning models. In Chapter 4 the back and the frond end of the email labeling tool is
detailed. Finally, in Chapter 5 a summary of the main contributions of this work and
suggestions for future developments are presented.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background and Context
This chapter is dedicated to exposing a review of the literature and give a context to
this dissertation. Section 2.1 describes the problem. Section 2.2 describes the gathered
information about the different methods that are currently being used. Section 2.2.1
gives an insight of what Blacklists are and gives examples of available services. Section
2.2.2 describes whitelists and proposed methods for their implementation. In section
2.2.3 some approaches with different heuristics are presented. Section 2.2.4 describes the
basics of machine learning, including some of the most used algorithms in the context
of phishing detection and offers some examples. Section 2.2.5 explains the method of
comparing webpages visually. Section 2.2.6 briefly explains the hybrid approaches. And
lastly, section 2.2.7 explains the specific case of smishing.
2.1 The Phishing Problem
Phishing is a type of cybercrime where the attackers pose as a legitimate entity, with
the intent of stealing sensitive personal information from unsuspecting users, through
the use social engineered techniques. These techniques, according to Criddle[1], can
be defined as types of manipulations used on users to make them believe they are
safe, when the opposite is true. Phishing attacks can be done by email or any other
social network or communication channel, hence the different names. They can cause
permanent damage to legitimate businesses, the financial loss is in the order of the
billions of dollars, and the situation is only getting worst.
2.1.1 Types of Phishing attacks
There are several types of phishing attacks, according to Shi et al. [2] they can take
many forms, the most common being the following.
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Clone Phishing
In these attacks, emails from a legitimate entity is obtained, cloned and changes are
made over it. Some of these changes may be that links are changed to redirect to
malicious websites, or email addresses are spoofed so the sender appears to be original,
or even the attachment of malicious content.
The target is not specifically defined, they are usually sent randomly to several
different destinations, in the hopes of fooling anyone who receives them.
Spear Phishing
These attacks have a specific target group, where only a pre-determined group of people,
with a common characteristic (e.g. people from the same organization), will receive
deceitful content.
Phone Phishing
Phone phishing consists of messages appearing to be from a reliable source requesting
users to contact a determined phone number for some seemingly reasonable motive.
The information theft occurs during the call.
2.1.2 Damage Report
According to Internet Crime Report from 2016[3], every year the average number of
complaints regarding phishing attacks is of about 280.000, with an estimated loss of
1.33 Billion dollars in 2016. Note that these values are only of reported occurrences,
real values are estimated to be much higher.
The motivation behind this type of attacks can be for financial gain, the stolen
information can be bank credentials; can be identity hiding, where the phishers might
sell the information to others who want to hide their identity; or even for fame and
notoriety.
2.2 Literature Review
To try and solve the phishing problem, many methods have been proposed and imple-
mented. Such methods can be summarized into five different categories: blacklisting,
whitelisting, machine learning, Heuristic and visual similarity. For each, a brief descrip-
tion of the category and some real examples are given.
2.2.1 Blacklisting
Blacklists are lists of URLs of known malicious sites. By querying such lists with URLs
which intent is unknown, it is possible to assert if it is in fact a phishing attempt or
not. This method is fairly simple to understand and implement as the algorithms only
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need to compare strings or sub-strings. But there is a great problem that invalidates
this solution in many cases, as it is extremely vulnerable to zero-day attacks. These
are attacks where the malicious content, in this case the URL, is new and was not yet
reported and added to the blacklists. Therefore, any query thrown at those lists will
receive a false negative response.
Some good examples of a popular blacklist services available are Phishtank, where
users submit suspected phishing URLs and a subsequent vote by other users will assert if
those URLs have a malicious intent or not, and Google safe browsing[4], a continuously
updated list where users can submit potential new malicious webpages or an automated
detection of websites occurs, but Google’s software will ultimately classify the page as
safe or not.
PhishNet [5]
Phishnet is a system that tries to improve the effectiveness of blacklists. It uses blacklists
and some heuristics to try and predict new phishing URLs. This is a possible solution
to the problem of the exact matching method that is traditionally used for blacklists
that makes it easy for attackers to exploit, as the slightest alteration on a word might
go unnoticed by the user and by the algorithm. Two components exist, the first being
the prediction of malicious URLs, and the second the approximate matching of URLs.
The first component, predicting malicious URLs, examines existing blacklists
and combines pieces of the URLs in those lists automatically, with some heuristics, to
generate new URLs. After this the generated URLs need to be validated.
Five heuristics used:
• Replacing Top-level domains (TLDs) - Try to find variants of the original blacklist
elements by changing only the TLD of the URLs.
• Internet Protocol (IP) address equivalence - The premise is that phishing cam-
paigns hosted by the same IP address might share the directory or path structure
as well. URLs with same address are clustered together and new URLs are created
by applying all possible combinations between hostname and paths.
• Directory structure similarity - The premise is that URLs with a similar directory
structure may also have similar set of file names. These URLs are clustered
and new URLs are created from the different combinations of filenames among
URLs within a cluster. For example "if www.abc.com/online/signin/ paypal.htm
and www.xyz.com/online/signin/ebay.htm are two known phishing URLs then
our heuristic predicts the existence of www.abc.com/online/signin/ebay.htm and
www.xyz.com/online/signin/paypal.htm"[5].
• Query string substitution - The use of query strings are a way to change the URL
without the destination being changed, this is a weakness of the exact matching
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method used in blacklists that can be exploited by attackers. This heuristic
tries to stop those exploits by creating combinations of query strings between
URLs already in the blacklist. For example if there are two URLs, www.abc.com/
online/signin/ebay?XYZ, and www.xyz.com/online/signin/paypal?ABC, two
new URLs are created, www.abc.com/online/signin/ebay?ABC and www.xyz.
com/online/signin/paypal?XYZ [5].
• Brand name equivalence - It is a know fact that attackers target legitimate brand
names using same URL structure method. This heuristic creates candidate URLs
by replacing brand names present by all the other known brand names.
After creating the candidates for new phishing URLs a validation must be done to
filter out the ones that are non-existent or legitimate. This validation process consists
in a first Domain Name System (DNS) lookup to determine if the URL exists. If so
a connection to the server is done and a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) GET
request is sent to get content from it. If the HTTP header from the response is a status
code of a successful response, a similarity detection tool is used to compare the parent
URL to the child. If they are found to be similar, the child is considered a phishing
URL and is added to the blacklist.
The second component, Approximate matching, does an approximate match
of new URLs to the ones in the blacklist, using methods based on regular expression
similarity and hashmaps to try and catch syntactic and semantic variations, so that
even if a new URL is not exactly matched to any entry of the blacklist, it can still be
caught and labeled as phishing.
The approximation relies on four different aspects of an URL that correspond to
module, from each a score is calculated. If the value computed from all the scores is
greater than a pre-configured threshold the URL is considered a possible threat.
The four modules used for the approximate matching are the following:
• Matching IP address - score is calculated from the number of IP addresses from
the blacklist that match the IP address of a new URL.
• Matching hostname - score is calculated from the number of blacklist entries that
match the hostname of a new URL.
• Matching directory structure - This module creates a hashmap with the directory
structure as keys, and the number of phishing URLs that contain the same
structure as correspondent values. The score is calculated by the value stored in
the hashmap where the key is the structure of the new URL.
• Matching brand names - From the pathnames and query strings of the URLs in
the blacklist brand names are extracted and a frequency score is attributed to
each brand. Brand names are also extracted from new URLs the same way, and
the score for a given URL is the frequency score of the extracted brand name.
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Observation of the results for the heuristics of the prediction of malicious URLs
shows that every new URL that is tested would have a very polarized classification,
meaning that they are either very similar or very dissimilar to the URLs in the blacklist.
The ones that have a similarity higher than a threshold would be considered as new
phishing URLs. For the approximate matching, a trade-off was evident between false
positives and false negatives, a higher threshold would yield more false negatives and a
lower would yield more false positives. Overall Phishnet has low false positives and is
very effective in adding malicious URLs to the blacklist.
A Phishing Sites Blacklist Generator [6]
This technique uses the advantages of blacklists and tries to go further by creating an
automatically and locally updated blacklist of fishing sites. What this means is that
the authors explored the fact that every webpage is associated to a website, and that in
most websites this relationship is evident through the use of logos. If phishing websites
steal the logo from the legitimate business to gain credibility, searching these for the
URLs of these images with a search engine, such as Google, to obtain the rightful
domain, might be a good way to reveal the website’s true intent. In this search only the
top 10 results are considered. If an URL goes through the algorithm and is considered
phishing, it is added to a blacklist that is used to filter out phishing attacks.
The algorithm proves to be very efficient, with a high accuracy for phishing detection
and a considerably low amount of false positives. However it is a very time consuming
approach if implemented locally and not on an email server.
2.2.2 Whitelisting
While in blacklists only malicious URLs are considered, in whitelists only legitimate
ones are saved and stored. Any webpage that is not listed by these lists is considered
suspicious. This solves the issue of zero-day attacks but leads to other problems. The
biggest being the fact that it is impossible to have listed all existing legitimate websites.
This method may cause a high amount of false positives as new legitimate sites might
not have been yet included.
The use of automated individual whitelists was proposed by Cao et al. [7]. They
automatically maintain a list of the commonly visited login interfaces of a single user.
The number of visited websites of any user is assumed to be small, according to Florencio
and Herley [8], meaning that the locally created whitelists are very small but very
effective. When the user visits a webpage that requires a login and it is not on the list,
a warning of a possible phishing attack is shown.
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2.2.3 Heuristic Methods For Phishing Detection
The heuristic methods employ the knowledge obtained from real phishing attacks
analysis to help create a mechanism to detect or prevent such attacks. The heuristics
consist in obtainable recurrent features that characterize phishing attacks. This type
of methods offer a better solution than the previously described, as they proved more
efficient than blacklists when dealing with zero-day attacks, and it does not yield
as many false positives as whitelists. One downside is the lack of adaptability, as
it is a static method, and the fact that it can have a considerable amount of false
negatives[9][10].
SpoofGuard [11]
Spoof is the name of any attempt that seeks to impersonate someone or something they
are not. SpoofGuard is a plug-in for web browsers to monitor a user’s activity while
browsing. The idea was to calculate a value, of name spoof index, that indicates the
likelihood of a visited website being a phishing attack. The user is warned about the
possible attack if the spoof index exceeds a threshold defined by the user. The index is
calculated using information about the website, and examination of outgoing post data.
The more suspicious characteristics there are, the higher the spoof index.
Upon visiting a webpage, SpoofGuard extracts and analyses these aspects:
• Domain check - It asserts if the user has previously visited the domain.
• Image-domain associations - Checks if the visited webpage was referenced from
an email site.
• URL check - Examins if the URL has misleading elements, and if a page domain
is relatively similar to a commonly spoofed or regularly visited domain.
• Image check - When an image is present it is compared to a database of images
and it’s legitimate domain is extracted, then this is compared to the domain
where the image was first obtained, this asserts if the image was stolen or not.
• Link check - Present links are put through a process similar to the URL check.
• Password check - When a login is required or if sensitive information is asked, the
plug-in checks if https is in use and if the certificate check succeeds
• Outgoing password check - There is also a mechanism that warns users if the login
information they inserted on a regularly visited webpage is in a domain different
than usual.
This heuristic had a considerable success and with no significant performance
penalties for the machines where the tests took place. This is not a solution for phishing
detection on emails as it is dedicated to function as a plug-in on a web browser, but
some procedures used can inspire new methods for prevention.
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Phishwish [12]
Phishwish is a phishing email filter which goals are to identify zero-day attacks, to create
a rule based system to simplify the detection process, and to make such process as efficient
as possible with the least amount false positives as possible. The algorithm is capable
of processing emails with either plain text or Hypertext Markup Language (HTML).
To categorize emails as either malicious or regular 11 rules are used. Each has an
associated weight and flag. Every rule will produce a value and the sum of said values
will determine the outcome of the algorithm. The higher the value the more likely it is
malicious. The rules are the following, if the rule applies it is an indication of phishing:
• Rule 1 - Sender email does not redirect to login page of the legitimate business,
this is verified through a search engine.
• Rule 2 - When an email has HTML content, and there are URLs displayed that use
Transport Layer Security (TLS) (a cryptographic protocol) but their respective
Hypertext Reference (HREF) does not.
• Rule 3 - The login URL is not a domain name, but is in the form of an IP address.
• Rule 4 - The business name is present in the login URL but is absent from the
domain.
• Rule 5 - The domain displayed by a URL is not the same as the domain specified
by the HREF.
• Rule 6 - The legitimate business name is not included in the Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP) header.
• Rule 7 - Assert if the domain of non-image URLs present in the email are different
from the domain of the login URL.
• Rule 8 - Assert if the domain name registrant, i.e. the entity registering the
domain name, of the non-image URLs present in the email are different from the
domain name registrant of the login URL.
• Rule 9 - Assert if the domain of URLs of images present in the email are different
from the domain of the login URL.
• Rule 10 - Assert if the domain name registrant of URLs of images present in the
email are different from the domain name registrant of the login URL.
• Rule 11 - Webpage is not accessible.
There were considerable problems of false positives and the detection of zero-day
attacks was not as successful as the authors intended. Overall it is a solution with many
faults and low flexibility but is a good example of a rule based approach.
CANTINA [13]
CANTINA is an approach that adapts an information retrieval algorithm known as
TF-IDF to phishing detection. A more detailed description of this algorithm is present
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in section 2.2.8. The output of this algorithm are the most characteristic words of the
corpus.
The idea behind CANTINA was based on the assumption that phishing sites usually
try to create a webpage very similar to the one owned by the legitimate business. This
means that by using Robust Hyperlinks (a method to fix broken URLs by adding
"signature" words so that if the address-based portion of an URL fails, the content-based
signature can be used to try and locate the original document by querying the signatures
to a search engine) with the proper signature words it would theoretically be possible
to find the genuine login page, as the words would be frequent in the current page but
rare across the web. The signatures are keywords extracted with a TF-IDF algorithm
from the phishing page, that usually are the names of the businesses being spoofed.
This approach only takes into consideration the five words with the highest TF-IDF
weights and then searches for them using Google. The login page is considered phishing
if there was no match between the domains of those pages and the login page in the
top N results of the search.
In order to reduce the amount of false positives some additional rules were imple-
mented:
• Age of Domain - Phishing sites tend to have a recent creation date, so the age of
the domain is considered as a good indicator, for this WHOIS search was used.
This method is powerless to attacks where the legitimate site was compromised,
as their domain will be considered as legitimate.
• Known Images - Nine logos of popular websites are saved locally so that if a
suspicious page has an image similar to one of them, but is in a different domain,
the algorithm classifies it as phishing. This process is very similar to one used in
SpoofGuard[11].
• Suspicious URL - The URL is checked for suspicious characters, namely "@" and
"-" due to their special meanings in this context. This process is very similar to
one used in SpoofGuard[11].
• Suspicious Links - The process of checking URLs is used to verify the links present
in the page.
• IP Address - Check if the domain name is in the form of an IP address. This
process is very similar to one used in Phishwish[12] and PILFER [14]
• Dots in URL - Binary values, where the number of dots in the URL is counted,
as experience showed that phishing URLs tend to have a higher number than
legitimate ones. The amount considered to be too much to be acceptable is greater
than four. This process is very similar to one used in PILFER[14].
• Forms - HTML code is examined for tags that allow input of text with suspicious
labels, such as "credit card" and "password", as this is the information that the
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attackers want.
The results of this approach were considerably good, with high true positives and
low false positives. The number of false positives was successfully reduced with the
heuristics described, but true positives decreased as a consequence. A major defect is
that this method is vulnerable to image-instead-of-text attacks, as the extraction of
keywords will not be as effective.
2.2.4 Machine Learning
Nowadays phishing attacks are becoming increasingly automated, this shift makes
traditional methods much less efficient in detecting new attacks. To solve this, more
adaptive mechanisms are being implemented, namely with machine learning algorithms,
as they can detect hidden patterns and feature correlations that would go unnoticed by
other methods.
There are many advanced machine learning algorithms that can be used to classify
attacks as phishing or regular. The unsupervised models organise the data in groups in
accordance to the various features. Its purpose is the extraction of a structure from the
dataset without no knowledge about the to which the data belongs to[15]. Whereas
supervised models try to classify the data within the available classes. In phishing it can
be considered the existence of only two separate classes, phishing and non-phishing. It
was observed that most of the proposed machine learning methods go for a supervised
approach, as it tends to yield better results[15].
In every machine learning model some steps have to be taken in order for them to
function correctly. Initially the proper dataset must be chosen, and a data preprocessing
sometimes is required to correctly format the data. This preprocessing might include
the removal of noise, a normalization process and possibly other actions that can be
applied, according to the problem it is proposed to solve. The original dataset should
be separated into training, validation and testing sets, Only then the machine learning
algorithms can be trained with the training set, then the algorithm that performed the
best with the validation set is chosen as the one to be used to solve the problem. Some
algorithms need some parameters to be chosen, the validation set can also be used to
find the values for the parameters that produce the best generalization of the problem.
The training and validation sets are then combined to train the chosen model one final
time, and the testing set is used to evaluate the final performance. Bellow some of the
observed algorithms used in different approaches are briefly described.
Linear Regression (LR). [16] attempts to find the hidden relationship between two
variables by defining a linear equation that best fits their relationship. These two are the
independent variable, or X, and the dependent variable, or Y. The equation produced
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by this model is Y = a + bX. a is the value of Y when X is zero, and b is the slope
of the produced line.
K-NN. [17] is an clustering algorithm that labels new points by finding and analyzing
the labels of the K nearest points from the training data. This model expects data
with similar characteristics to have the same labels.
It is specially a useful when there is no knowledge about the data distribution.[18]
Decision trees. [19] have a structure similar to flowcharts, where an attribute is tested
in every node. A branch connected to a node is the outcome of the test from the same
node, and the leafs of the graph are the final classifications. The path from the first
node to a leaf represents the classification rules.
This classifier is able to process data of numerical,nominal or textual type, it is also
robust to noise. It offers a good generalization for the prediction of classes new entries,
with a high performance contrasting to the low computational effort needed, although
this model is not so efficient when high dimensional data is considered.
The process of building a decision tree usually takes a considerable amount of time.
The strategy followed is divide and conquer, meaning that the nodes test the features
of a new entry sequentially until a leaf is reached, giving a prediction to its class.
The method works well when there are attributes with high relevance, but is not that
efficient when features have complex interactions. Some major problems are the error
propagation that occurs through the tree, and the need for a proper pruning of the tree,
as it can easily overfit. To solve the last problem random forest, which is an ensemble
of threes, is a more appropriate method.
Random forests. [19] are several trained decision trees, where the prediction of the
outcome is the most voted class among all the trees. It is scalable, robust to noise, does
not overfit, fast and easy to understand and visualize the results. One problem is that
with a high number of trees in the forest, the model can hardly offer a real-time answer.
Boosted Trees. [20] is a supervised classifier based on Gradient boosting, a technique
that creates an ensemble of classifiers that function together as just one prediction
model. Tree Boosting is composed by an ensemble of regression trees, i.e. decision trees
with continuous values. This model can produce great and robust results, and is very
efficient for noisy datasets.
Bayesian Networks. [19] is a graphical model that represents the dependencies between
features. It is a model that needs fitting. It is not very efficient when the dataset has a
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high dimensionality, as the network would require too much memory and time to work
properly.
Naive Bayes. [19] is an supervised classifier and is a type of Bayesian network with
only one parent node and many child nodes, where it is assumed that there is a strong
independence between these last nodes, this is called class conditional independence. If
this assumption is found to be true to a certain example, the model converges fast to
the class prediction. The training process takes relatively low computational time. The
value that results from the prediction of a class is a probability. This algorithm works
best when there is a clear independence between features.
Support Vector Machine (SVM). [19] is a supervised non-probabilistic binary classifier,
where a hyperplane or a set of hyperplanes are created for classification of data. An
SVM maps the original feature space into a higher dimensional kernel space in order
to find the hyperplane that best fits the classification problem, i.e. that separates the
training data in two classes with the maximum margin possible. This margin is defined
by a subset of training data points, called support vectors, making it more memory
efficient. The larger the maximum margin, the better generalization is achieved. The
prediction works by mapping the new entries into the kernel space, and then determining
to which side of the margin it belongs to. The choice of the kernel function is crucial
for making the method computationally efficient.
Although it is a complex algorithm, it offers good generalization for high dimensional
spaces and, with the proper kernel, it is useful for cases where there are more dimensions
than number of samples. It offers high accuracy and prevents some common overfitting
issues, the performance independent from the size of the dataset but dependent from
the number of training cycles. Some major setbacks are the low training process speed
and the dependency on the right choice of parameters.
Biased Support Vector Machine (BSVM). [15] is a type support vector machines
for hard classification problems where the idea is to decompose the problems into
subproblems. It works well with unbalanced data.
Neural Networks. [19] is an algorithm inspired by the structure of the human brain
and it’s ability to learn. Through the training process a highly interconnected network
constituted by processing elements (known as neurons) is obtained, with this and a set
of inputs a set of outputs is obtainable. Some configuration are needed, one can stop
changing the configurations of the network when the results seem appropriate.
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Multi-layer Perceptron. [15], a supervised method, is the most used neural network
and is a collection of perceptrons. The perceptrons are the simplest form of a neural
network with nothing but one single neuron where the weights of the features are
adjustable. This model is useful for complex problems, is robust to noise, but is very
hardware and time demanding when training. In order for the model to work best
the correct size of the hidden layer must be chosen. That is a hard task, as hidden
layer that is too big or too small may lead to inappropriate results. The model is very
sensitive to the parameters that are chosen for it.
Self Organizing Map (SOM). [15], an unsupervised algorithm, is a type of neural
network that organizes the data in clusters, through a competitive process, and maps
it onto a two dimensional map, reducing the dimensionality. New data is mapped
as well and is classified by which node is the closest to it. This model is useful for
dimensionality reduction for better interpretation of the data.
K-Means. [15] is an unsupervised model that organizes the data into K clusters, hence
the name, where every entry is assigned to the cluster with the nearest mean. The
mean of a cluster is the mean point between all the points assigned to that same cluster.
The result is a partition of data into Voronoi cells with somewhat similar sizes. This
algorithm is computationally demanding, but with the right heuristics a local optimal
can be obtained much faster.
Detecting Phishing Emails Using Hybrid Features[21]
This method proposes the creation of a robust classifier using hybrid features, where
the best ones are selected through an information gain evaluator.
It was found that different types of features support each other in the detection of
phishing, and that few approaches consider the structure and orthographic features of a
phishing email. Three types of features, that had to be extracted, are described below.
• Content features - domain specific keywords that can be used to identify semantic
contexts.
• Orthographic features - text elements that define the style of the presented page.
These elements give functionality to words or sentences, some examples are HTML
features, scripts or images.
• Derived features - obtained from existing content or orthographic features, one
example is the similarity between visible and hidden links.
Taking into account the three types of feature, seven different features related to emails
are used:
1. Links - number of links.
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2. Nonv_links - number of invisible links.
3. Nonmatching URLs - binary value that asserts if the hidden URL is the same as
the visible.
4. Forms - existence of forms.
5. Scripts - type of script present, where 0 is none and from 1 to 6 are different types.
6. Body Blacklist Words - amount of appearances of predefined words that might
indicate phishing attack, a small blacklist of words, in the body of an email.
7. Subject Blacklist Words - amount of appearances of predefined words that might
indicate phishing attack, a small blacklist of words, in the subject of an email.
Before classification the features are normalized in order to belong to similar range of
values.
After obtaining the normalized features, a preliminary classifier is created, the results
are used to assert the importance of the features, using an information gain algorithm.
With this information only the more relevant features were used to effectively train the
classifiers, removing possible noise. The classifiers used were five and they were decision
tree, random forest, multi-layer perceptron, naive bayes and support vector machine.
After the training and testing processes of all the machine learning algorithms the one
that showed the best results was the decision tree.
The final product was a decision tree classifier capable of removing redundant
features, trained recursively by different datasets, that ultimately has a very high
phishing detection accuracy.
Classification of Phishing Email Using Random Forest Machine Learning Technique[22]
In this method[22] some characteristics of known methods influenced the objectives
of this tool. It was pointed out that models that use visual processing tend to be
time consuming and require additional space in order to function. Another method
that is used is querying over the network to obtain features, this process might lead to
significant run time increases. To avoid any of this problems it was proposed a method
in which all features are directly extracted directly from the email information.
The proposed features in [22] were the most frequently used by phishing attackers,
according to their sources, and in total they are 15:
• URLs Containing IP Address - binary value that determines whether there is an
IP address in the URL or not.
• Disparities between HREF Attribute and link text - binary value that determines
if the visible text of a link has a disparity relative to the HREF associated with
the link.
• Presence of keywords in the visible text of a link- binary values that asserts if one
or more keywords are in the text of a link, these words are "Link", "Click", "Here",
"update" and "Login".
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• Number of dots in domain name - Count the number of dots in the URL. The
amount considered to be too much to be acceptable is greater than three.
• HTML Email - binary value that indicates if the email is HTML formatted, as it
was found that there is a tendency for its use in phishing attacks.
• Presence of Javascript - Binary value that flags the presence of the string
"javascript" either in the body of the email ro in a link, as javascript might
be used by attackers to hide information.
• Number of links - number of links present in the email.
• Number of linked to domain - amount of different domains from all the urls present
in the email.
• From body MatchDomain check - All domain names are extracted from the email
and are compared to the domain of the sender, if there one domain does not
match the email is considered phishing.
• Word list features - Specific words were found to be frequent in phishing emails,
to try and catch them in the most appropriate way a division in six features was
proposed, where each feature has a set of words or stemmed words. The features
are a value that equals the normalized count of present keywords in the email.
The word sets are the following:
– "Update" and "Confirm".
– "User", "Customer" and "Client".
– "Suspend", "Restrict" and "Hold".
– "Verify", "Account" and "Notif".
– "Login", "Username", "Password", "Click" and "Log".
– "SSN", "Social Security", "Secur" and "Inconvinien".
With the features normalized and ready to be used by a machine learning algorithm,
they proceeded to testing their algorithm with a random forest classifier. They had
available 2000 emails and they studied the impact of different dataset sizes in the
accuracy of the classifier. A 10-fold Cross-validation (CV) method was used to the
provide an estimate of the generalization error. The information gain was also calculated
and only the eight features with the highest values were kept.
The results were very promising, but further testing should have been done, as even
better results could have been obtained if other classifiers had been used, without the
need for extra features.
Detection of Phishing Attacks: A Machine Learning Approach[15]
This approach tries to classify phishing emails using key features from emails and
test results of different machine learning algorithms, namely Support Vector Machines
(SVM, BSVM and Leave One Model Out), Neural Networks, SOMs and K-Means on
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the dataset [15], to provide an overview of their efficiency in the subject of phishing
detection.
The features extracted from emails were the same as the ones used by other published
approaches, but some new ones were created to use the knowledge of attack methods of
phishers. The sixteen features used were extracted using Python and JavaScript, and
they are are the following:
• HTML Email - binary value determining if an email is HTML formatted or not,
as most phishing attacks use this.
• IP-based URL - binary value determining if an email has links with an IP address
instead of a domain name.
• Age of domain name - binary feature that determines if an existing domain name
is less than 30 days old. A WHOIS query is done to determine this fact.
• Number of domains - number of different domain names present in the email, it
is a continuous feature (not binary).
• Number of sub-domains - number of sub-domains of an URL, it is a continuous
feature.
• Presence of JavaScript - binary value determining if an email has JavaScript or
not, as phishers usually use this.
• Presence of form tab - binary value determining the presence or absence of forms
on an HTML formatted email. Some emails might have forms asking for personal
information to latter submit the information to illegitimate destinations.
• Number of links - total number of links present in the email. It is a continuous
feature.
• Matching domain (From & Body) - All domain names are extracted from the
email and are compared to the domain of the sender, if there one domain does
not match the email is considered phishing. It is a binary feature.
• Keywords - Continuous feature that counts the number of predetermined words
in an email. The words are grouped and each group is considered a feature. The
groups have the following words associated:
– "Update" and "Confirm"
– "User", "Customer" and "Client"
– "Suspend", "Restrict" and "Hold"
– "Verify", "Account"
– "Login", "Username", "Password"
– "SSN", "Social Security"
The dataset had 4000 emails, with 973 of them being phishing emails and the others
were legitimate ones. The whole of the dataset was divided, where 2000 entries were
used for training the models and the remaining emails were used for testing.
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The machine learning model that achieved the best results was the SVM, closely
followed by the Biased Support Vector Machine (BSVM) and the Artificial Neural
Networks. The algorithm that yield the worst results was K-Means clustering, making
it obvious that unsupervised approaches are not as efficient.
Phishing Website Classification: A Machine Learning Approach[23]
In this approach a very thorough investigation and testing was done to try to find the
best classification process, with the bare minimum features. The dataset was created
with phishing URLs from PhishTank that were still active, and non-phishing URLs from
Google. This was then divided into three subsets, all with a total of 1750 URLs, with
different ratios of phishing URLs, 50:50, 70:30 30:70, to evaluate their performances.
The features were chosen based on research regarding this matter [24]–[26]. The
features are the following, as described in [23].
• ID - Unique number of each row.
• URL - Web address of page.
• TITLE - Title of each webpage.
• HTML_Source_Code - HTML source code of webpage.
• Alexa_Rank - Value of Alexa Rank ranging.
• IP_Address - Represented as 1 if present and -1 otherwise.
• SSL_Connection - Represented as 1 if present and -1 otherwise.
• Long_URL - Length of URL.
• Dots - Number of dots present in URL reflecting how many sub-domains used.
• At_Symbol - Represented as 1 if "@" symbol is embedded or -1 if absent.
• Hexadecimal - Represented as 1 if hexadecimal codes are present and -1 if not.
• Frame - Represented as 1 if present and -1 if not.
• Redirect - Represented as 1 if the webpage has a code to redirect user to another
destination and -1 if not.
• Submit - Represented 1if the webpage has a form to send data and -1 if not.
• Googe_Page_Rank - Value of Google Page Rank ranging from 0 to 10.
• Google_Position - Position of the in google search. It ranges from 0 which means
non-existence to 300 hundreds.
• Label - Classification of each webpages into phishing (1) and nonphishing (0).
They evaluated several methods for detection of phishing. First, a pruning decision
tree was configured and tested, followed by a number of other known machine learning
algorithms. Lastly, ensembles of previously configured algorithms were tested. The
models used were LR, K-NN, C4.5 decision tree and SVM. Their performance is
measured by precision, recall, f1-score and accuracy.
For the pruning decision tree the C4.5 algorithm presented by Quinlan in [27]. It
has the advantage of using gain ratio rather than information gain, as the last has
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bias attribute selection with large number values [28], which was the case. Gain ratio
changes information gain of every feature to create a more consistent scaling. It uses
equation 2.1.
GainRatio = InformationGain
SplitInformation
(2.1)
Some parameters need to be defined in decision tree models. According to Akanbi
et al.[23], some of these parameters are the minimal size, a value that is the minimum
number of entries per node that if exceeded will result in the splitting of a node. The
minimal leaf size is the equivalent to the previous parameter but only applies to the
leaf nodes. To choose them correctly a repetitive process was done that would test the
different performances of the algorithm in these different conditions.
For overfitting prevention, a post pruning process was applied, of name pessimistic
pruning. This uses statistical correlation test, where an error rate is obtained and a
node is pruned according to this value. For the correct use of this error an additional
variable of name confidence is created to define the confidence level given to the error
calculation. For this variable a repetitive process was done to find the optimal value.
The pruning process did not change the performance or accuracy of the algorithm,
but reduced significantly the complexity and implementation time.
After completion of the decision tree tests, other classifiers are evaluated. Their
procedure consisted in testing every combination of classifiers and datasets. In the case
of the K-NN many values for K were tested (from 1 to 7), with the values of 1 and 2
being the best. The K-NN 1, K-NN 2, C4.5 algorithm, LR and SVM models, suffer a
performance test with 9 different values for CV (from 10 to 90 where x would be 10, 20,
30, ...,90). In general, the K-NN produced the best results. The sampling method used
for every test was Stratified sampling.
Having tested the performance of the models individually, they now created four
ensembles to try to improve the results. The idea was to create a voting mechanic
between the algorithms.
All ensembles were tested with the different datasets again, the best being the
ensemble 1 (K-NN, C4.5 decision tree and LR), with a balanced dataset, meaning that
they work best when the data is balanced between phishing and non-phishing entries.
Finally, after comparing the results of the best performing approaches it was found
that the pruning decision tree performed the best and is closely followed by the other
techniques.
2.2.5 Visual Similarity
This type of approach, according to Khonji et al. [10], has some similarities with
whitelisting and blacklisting as it needs a reference dataset to find out the legitimacy
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of a website, but has the advantage of being able to detect more efficiently zero-hour
attacks. It relies on the assumption that phishers create websites similar to the victim’s
websites, hence the usefulness of comparing pages visually, as a phishing website similar
to a non-phishing website that does not have the same characteristics (same domain
for example) can be considered phishing. But this might reveal to be flawed as the
attackers do not always copy the legitimate website.
PhishZoo: Detecting Phishing Websites By Looking at Them [29]
PhishZoo is a proposed approach for phishing detection that involves content similarity
techniques. The basic idea is to create profiles of websites which are regarded as sensitive
by the user, and latter use these to compare to visited websites to assert if they are
trying to mimic them. It is fundamentally a whitelist method that compares visual
elements between sites, and can be used in association with blacklists for detection of
zero-day attacks.
PhishZoo is said to be able to detect attacks that would not be detected by URL
based machine learning techniques [29]. It references also that users keep only a small
set of sensitive websites with sensitive data [7], meaning that saving these is enough to
protect the user against phishing attacks on these particular sites.
The workflow of this approach starts by loading a website and matching it against
the stored profiles, if there is a match between SSL and URL between them the site is
considered safe. If not, some features are extracted from it, namely the tokens in the
hostname, URL and HTML files, and predefined keywords from the legitimate sites are
compared to these. Then all images are extracted and compared to the stored ones, the
images are usually logos. Finally, a website is considered phishing if there is in fact a
match between these extracted features and the stored ones from the protected sites.
The image matching process relies on SIFT [30], an image-matching algorithm with
Euclidean distance calculations between key points of the images. Testing reveals that
almost all of the phishing websites are detected, but with false positive rate. This
method is considerably demanding in processing time. Phishers try to go unnoticed by
conventional image matching algorithms by changing the original image slightly, this
way humans can not detect those changes, but the algorithms think it is a different
image. SIFT is able to detect these small distortions successfully.
The results showed that, by only using keyword matching, the algorithm gives a
better accuracy than by using both keyword and image matching, although with high
false positives. It is possible to observe that a significant number of phishing sites
use the same elements as the legitimate sites. Ultimately, the approach with image
matching produces the best results. The major problem is that when images need to
be compared, the time needed is between 7 and 17 seconds, for just one website.
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Visual Similarity-based Phishing Detection without Victim Site Information [31]
The approach is able to detect phishing websites even without an initial database. Some
assumption are made regarding phishing sites: that they mimic legitimate ones, that
they visually similar to the targeted sites, and that phishing sites can be similar to
other phishing sites. The system stores images of websites, the domain name and the
correspondent label, that can be of phishing, legitimate or unknown.
The algorithm compares domains and images in order to assert if a website is
phishing or if it is legitimate. A new URL is opened in a browser and both the domain
and an image of the presented webpage are obtained. The image is compared to the ones
previously stored. If the similarity between the images exceeds a predefined threshold,
the domains of the matching images are compared as well. If the domains match too,
the image is stored with the same label as the matched image. If there is an image
match but no domain match, the site is considered phishing. If no stored images are
matched, the result is unknown and the image is stored.
To capture a websites image a virtual screen is used and the important parts of it
are extracted.
2.2.6 Hybrid approach
A hybrid approach is any approach that tries to join two or more methods described
above, in an attempt to solve common issues that exist. For example PhishBlock[32]
proposes a system that uses lookup lists (whitelist and blacklist) and SVM classifiers at
the same time for the detection of phishing attacks.
2.2.7 Smishing attacks
In the previous sections emails were mostly used by phishers as bait. Smishing is a
subtype of phishing attacks, where the communication channel utilized by phishers
is through Short Message Service (SMS). Although some of the already described
characteristics of phishing attacks also exist in smishing, there are a few specific
peculiarities about these last that must be taken into account.
Through research it was found that there are two most used methods for detection
of smishing attacks. The first are techniques based on blacklists, where any SMS sent
by an entity previously recorded and categorized as malicious is blocked. The second
is the extraction of information from the message and consequent data analysis by
machine learning algorithms. This last one has the advantage of being able to deal with
zero day attacks.
For the machine learning algorithms to be able to predict correctly the intent of an
SMS they need the correct set of features that best characterize them. These features
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are usually the result of a rule-based system, where it may include such rules as the
one below. These rules are a collection of rules from [33], [34].
• Presence of URL.
• Content to which an existing acurl refers to. If it redirects to the download of an
application or harmful site.
• Presence of mathematical symbols.
• Presence of currency signs.
• Presence of suspicious words.
• Length of message exceeds a predefined maximum.
• Presence of self-answering messages, where the sender asks the user to subscribe
or unsubscribe to a product.
• Presence of characters such as numerals.
• Presence of an email address.
2.2.8 TF-IDF Algorithm
Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF)[35] tries to find the most
significant words in a collection of documents. First the so called stop words, such as
"the", "and", are ignored. Then the algorithm computes the Term Frequency (TFij)
for every word i in document j. TF is the ratio between the occurrences of word i in
document j (fij) and the number of occurrence of the word with the highest frequency
in the same document, this normalizes it giving a score from zero to one for every word
in the same document. This is computed with the mathematical equation 2.2.
TFij =
fij
MAXkfkj
(2.2)
Then the Inverse Document Frequency is calculated for every word i (IDFi) with
equation 2.3, where N is the total amount of documents in the corpus, i.e. collection of
emails, and ni the amount of documents with the term i.
IDFi = log2(N/ni) (2.3)
Lastly, the final scores for every word i in document j is a combinations of formulas
2.2 and 2.3, giving the final equation 2.4.
TF.IDF = TFif × IDFi (2.4)
The higher this score is, the most significant it is to characterize the corpus.
22
2.2.9 Performance Metrics
Out-Of-Bag (OOB) Error
This error estimation method is mostly used for decision tree based models. It uses
a technique called bagging, or bootstrap aggregation, where random samples from the
data are placed into several bags. Each tree of the decision tree based model is trained
with a newly generated bag, and the error of this tree is calculated with all samples not
included in that bag[36]. The OOB error is the average of all errors.
Accuracy
A performance metric meant to verify the rate of correct predictions made by a
classification model. This value is calculated as shown in equation 2.5.1
Accuracy = TruePositives+ TrueNegatives
TruePositives+ TrueNegatives+ FalsePostives+ FalseNegatives
(2.5)
Precision
Performance metric to evaluate the rate of correct positive1 predictions against all
positive predictions. This value is calculated as shown in equation 2.6.
Precision = TruePositives
TruePositives+ FalsePositives (2.6)
Recall
Performance metric to evaluate the rate of correct positive1 predictions against all truly
positive samples. This value is calculated as shown in equation 2.7.
Precision = TruePositives
TruePositives+ FalseNegatives (2.7)
F1 Score
This score uses both Recall and Precision to calculate a new value that summarizes
those values into one. To calculate this, equation 2.8 is used.
Precision = 2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall (2.8)
1In the context of this thesis, positive refers to the classification of an email as phishing, and
negative as the classification of an email as ordinary
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Area Under the Curve (AUC)
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are a visual representation of the
relation between true positives rate and false positive rate of the predictions made from
a machine learning model. AUC is the measurement of the area bellow the line produced
between the above described relation, it is the likelihood of a classifier assigning a higher
score to a random positive sample than to a random negative sample.[37]
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CHAPTER 3
Phishing Detection System
The phishing detection system was developed off-line, at a proof of concept level, before
being implemented in the E-goi company. In this chapter is described the process of
choosing the most suitable architecture in terms of number and type of the features
and classification models. Different feature selection approaches and classifiers were
studied. The detection systems were trained and tested with publicly available real
data, i.e. emails from real users.
During the system development the experience of the E-goi collaborators was crucial.
The choice of specific features was suggested based on their domain expertise.
Machine learning classification techniques were preferred instead of empirical solu-
tions, due to their proven success in dealing with such type of problems and particularly
their efficiency in catching zero day attacks.
The structure of the created concept is as follows. The first step was to understand
the company’s work-flow and the system requirements, as detailed in section 3.1. The
next step was to obtain a suitable dataset, described in section 3.2. The process to
extract the relevant information and store it on a Comma Separated Values (CSV) file
for further use, detailed in section 3.3. The feature selection is described in section 3.4.
The results of training and validation of phishing detection models are shown in section
3.5 with 80% of the data. The performance of the model with optimized parameters is
finally evaluated with the test sub set (20 %) and the results are discussed in section
3.6.
3.1 E-goi Requirements
E-goi has two relevant types of clients for this thesis. The first are users that want to
advertise a product through the company’s platform. The second are people or other
companies that are willing to receive these marketing campaigns. The company also
25
has its own specific work-flow to deal with the emails. The first type of clients create
marketing campaigns in the form of emails and ask for them to be sent to a specific
list of clients of the second type. Before the campaigns are sent to the people in these
lists, they have to go through a series of filters. It would be at this step of the whole
work-flow that the phishing detection system needs to be implemented.
The major requirement of the company was to create a system that would help to
correctly filter regular emails, with the minimum amount of phishing emails classified
as regular (false negative). The goal is to save time of the workers that had to go
through thousands of emails to verify their authenticity, when only a small portion
would actually be of phishing nature.
3.2 Email datasets
3.2.1 E-goi dataset
Originally it was intended to use a dataset from clients of E-goi. This dataset is currently
under construction, it has 1200 labeled emails, where only around 30 are phishing
attacks. Due to the lack of sufficiently large number of labeled phishing emails, a
different solution had to be found. In section 4 a tool to solve this problem is proposed.
3.2.2 Engineered dataset
In order to create a representative and sufficiently large dataset with balanced number
of regular and phishing emails more creative approach had to be applied . Major
requirement was to include emails with similar format and characteristics as the type of
E-goi emails (mainly marketing campaigns). This was a challenging task as the search
has shown that there is not readily available dataset to comply with the requirements,
it had to be somehow engineered.
The created dataset was formed from two different sources. Around 7000 emails
labeled as regular were randomly selected from over 600,000 emails available in the
Enron Email Dataset [38], described in more details in [39]. Around 4000 phishing
emails were obtained from the Fraudulent E-mail Corpus [40] uploaded on the website
[41].
All phishing emails were originally in a single text file, to be able to work with them,
a separation into independent files for each email had to be done. Thus, the data were
stored in files with typical eml extension for emails, one file per email. Within their
content the emails were formated in Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)
and were converted into HTML.
Data were separated in two sub-datasets, where 80% is used for training and
validation, and 20% for testing.
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3.3 Description of Feature Structures
The emails are mainly text documents and therefore the phishing detection can be
seen as a text classification problem. In text classification the aim is to induce a
hypothesis using an algorithm that can predict the label of new examples as accurately
as possible. If a vector with one element for each occurring term in the whole collection
is used to represent a document, there can be a high dimensional feature space that
can bring not only computational problems, but also the over-fitting of data, which
can inhibit the classifier to generalize and thus predict the classification of unseen
data. As a consequence, feature selection is usually applied. They are also referred as
dimensionality reduction methods since their goal is to reduce the size of the document
representation, controlling the computational burden involved, whilst maintaining or
improving the classification performance, as they prevent the mislead in classification.
Besides their importance, it is not an easy task, as potentially useful information can
then be disregarded. Feature selection aims to reduce the document representation by
identifying a smaller set of terms that could represent the document more effectively.
One of the most successful and commonly used document representation is the
vector space model, where a feature is defined as a word occurring in a document. Filter
methods are simple methods. Some scoring measure is defined so the relative importance
of a term can be represented. The score is assigned to each feature independently, then
sorted according to the assigned score, and finally a predefined number of the best
features is taken to form the solution feature subset. Filter methods consider attributes
independently from the algorithm that will use them, relying on general characteristics
of the training set to select some features and discard others.
Stopword removal can be considered a basic filter method and rely on the assumption
that some words, such as articles, prepositions, and conjunctions, called stopwords,
are non-informative words, and occur more frequently than informative ones. Those
words are then included in a list and filtered in the document representation process, as
they could mislead correlations between documents. Despite the advantages of being
simple and independent of the classifier used, the above mentioned methods also have
the disadvantage of totally ignoring the effect of the selected feature subset on the
performance of the classifier.
Many state of the art approaches use the URL based features, where every peace of
the URL is explored and publicly available black and white lists can be consulted. The
developed system was to be implemented on the servers of E-goi and the algorithms had
to work with what was given to them. The problem arises when most of the URLs are
stripped from the emails that are fed to this server. Because of this, this thesis could not
rely solely on URLs. This complicated the development process, as new approaches had
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to be formulated to try and solve this problem. One solution was the use of automated
keyword search, with the TF-IDF algorithm. This problem was taken in consideration
when the created dataset, described in section 3.2, was being researched.
3.3.1 Feature Structure 1 - Binary Features
The state of the art analysis has shown that many of the phishing detection systems
rely mostly on binary features with only some real-valued features, as seen in [22] and
[15]. To try to understand the importance of this combination, and the relevance of
keeping real-valued features, a binary features structure was first created.
The TF-IDF algorithm was applied to extract the most typical words used by
phishers. The top 15 most frequently used words in the corpus were found to be enough
for the classification purposes. This process is detailed in section 3.3.4.
The collected features are listed below, they closely follow typical binary features
suggested in the literature. If the condition verifies, the feature value is set to 1,
otherwise it is assigned to 0:
1. If the number of links present in the email are more than 3
2. If the URLs present in the email have different domains
3. If the average number of subdomains of the URLs is greater than one
4. If any specific form exists in the email
5. If any specific script exists in the email
6. If the email is HTML formated
7. Presence of IPs in the URLs
8. If the average number of dots in URLs exceeds 2
9. If the average length of URLs is greater than 35
10. If any "@" symbol is found in the URLs
11. If any "-" symbol is found in the URLs
12. If the client sent the email on a weekend
13. If the client sent the email outside working hours (between 8am and 6pm)
14. If the client created the account in less than a year
15. Presence of certain words in the emails. This includes the words contained in the
list obtained from the TF-IDF algorithm, where every word is considered as one
feature.
16. Six features that represent the presence of certain words in the emails. It includes
some predefined sets of words or substrings, where each set is one feature and if
at least one of the words occurs in the email the feature is set to 1:
a) set1 - "Update" and "Confirm"
b) set2 - "User", "Customer" and "Client"
c) set3 - "Suspend", "Restrict" and "Hold"
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d) set4 - "Verify", "Account" and "Notif"
e) set5 - "Login", "Username", "Password", "Click" and "Log"
f) set6 - "SSN", "Social Security", "Secur" and "Inconvinien"
3.3.2 Feature Structure 2 - Combination of Binary and Real Value
Features
Binary features do not count the frequency of occurrences of a condition and therefore
revealed to be less efficient for phishing detection as it will be demonstrated further in
the thesis. For example set4 would get value of 1 both if only one word or all words of
the set occur in the email. To handle this problem a new email preprocessing method
was applied to extract a combination of binary and real value features that prove to be
more relevant for the problem in hand.
The TF-IDF algorithm was again applied to create the list of words typically
occurring in phishing emails and not frequently used in regular emails. The same
process was used as in section 3.3.1.
A few features are still binary, but most of them count the number of occurrences
of specific characteristics of the emails. The features are as described bellow.
1. n_link (Real) - Sum of the links present in the email.
2. n_domain (Real) - Number of different domains. Every URL present has a
domain, all existing domains on a particular email are compared. The total
number of different domains is the value of this feature.
3. n_subdomain (Real) - Average number of sub-domains. For every URL present
in the email the sub-domains are counted. The final value is the average of these
values.
4. form_script_html (Real) - Sum of three elements: any existing forms; number
of existing scripts; presence of HTML.
5. ip_at_minus (Real) - Sum of three elements relative to URLs: presence of IP;
presence of "-" or "@" symbols.
6. n_dots (Real) - Average number of dots in URLs present in a single email.
7. length (Real) - Average length of the URLs present in a single email.
8. max_len_url (Real) - Length of the longer URL.
9. week_day (Binary) - 1 if the email was sent over the weekend, otherwise is set
to 0.
10. working_hour (Binary) - 1 if the email was sent outside working hours of the
country of origin (from 8am to 6pm), otherwise is set to "0".
11. Six features that account for the presence of certain words in the email content.
It includes predefined sets of words or substrings, where each set is considered as
one feature. The sum of occurrences of the words in the set is the value assigned
to the feature:
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a) set1 (Real) - "Update" and "Confirm".
b) set2 (Real) - "User", "Customer" and "Client".
c) set3 (Real) - "Suspend", "Restrict" and "Hold".
d) set4 (Real) - "Verify", "Account" and "Notif".
e) set5 (Real) - "Login", "Username", "Password", "Click" and "Log".
f) set6 (Real) - "SSN", "Secur" and "Inconvinien".
12. Kwords_name_fuzzy (Real) - Sum of occurrences of predefined keywords
similar to the client’s name. These words are a combination of previously seen
attacks and brand names in phishing emails. Some examples are "bank", "card",
"credit" and many brand names such as "visa", "yahoo" or "wells”. This keyword
list is dynamic, i.e. words can be added or removed from the list. 343 words were
used in this feature structure. The phisher attackers often make small changes in
one or few characters of the word so that it goes unnoticed to humans and exact
matching between words. Therefore, the words do not need to have an exact
matching with the client’s name of the analysed email, if the algorithm finds a
similarity between the client’s name and a keyword from the list it will count it
as an occurrence.
13. Kwords_subject (Real) - This feature is similar to the Kwords_name_fuzzy,
but now a similarity between the content of the email subject and the words from
the predefined keywords list is searched.
14. Kwords_name_exact (Real) - similar to the Kwords_name_fuzzy12, but now
exact matching between the client’s name and the words from the predefined
keywords list is searched. To improve the matching all letters are transformed
into lower case. For example the word "Paypal" is first transformed into "paypal"
and then is compared to the keyword "paypal". If all characters in the words
match, the algorithm will count it as an occurrence.
15. TF-IDF-based features (Real) - maximum of 15 additional features are added
corresponding to the sum of occurrences in the email of each of the words extracted
by the TF-IDF algorithm (bag of words).
3.3.3 Feature Structure 3 - E-goi feature set
Due to the specific nature of the digital marketing emails, new features were defined to
reflect the long term experience of the E-goi experts dealing manually with phishing
email filtering.
Some changes in the content of the features described in section 3.3.2 were applied.
Since the company deals mainly with clients from Portugal, the TF-IDF extracted
features contains mostly Portuguese words. Some examples are "banco" and its
translation "bank", "card", "dispositivo", "alerta", "desbloqueio" (unlock), "protocol",
"atualizacao", "brasil" (the country Brazil). There are also many brand names.
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The following new features were added to the Feature structure 2 described in
section 3.3.2
1. utc_working_hour (Binary) - UTC working hour. This feature is based on
the metadata of the sent email regarding its location and sent date and time. The
working hour feature only takes into consideration the sender time, but an attack
might be sent within working hours of the sender country but outside working
hours of the company receiving the attack. This feature is set to "1" if the email
was sent outside working hours in UTC time zone, otherwise is set to "0".
2. nameVSemail (Real) - This feature counts the matching between the client’s
names and its email address. It is hypothesized that the higher this value is, the
lower the likelihood of the email being a phishing attack. The algorithm first
separates all names of the client into a list, for example the client’s name "John
Mark" will create a list with two elements: "john" and "mark". Each element of
this list is compared to the email address. With the same example, the client’s
first name "john" is compared to the email "phishing@gmail.com" where there are
no similarities, but if the email is "john@gmail.com" it becomes more trustworthy.
The matching of words is approximate.
3. bad_country (Binary) - Blacklist of countries found to be a regular source of
attacks. Feature set to "1" if a country from the blacklist is detected in the email
content. Some examples are the countries India, Morocco, Nigeria,Tunisia.
4. bad_char (Binary) - Existence of unprintable characters such as "♣", "♥" or "[".
Digits, letters, punctuation, and whitespaces are not considered as bad characters.
Feature set to "1" if the email has characters considered as unprintable. These
"bad characters" are usually result of strange encoding of emails. This might be
an indicator of an attack, as the phishers try to hide the content of the email
from the algorithms.
3.3.4 Feature Extraction Process
The database of emails was divided in two directories, one for phishing and another for
ordinary emails. Using the TF-IDF algorithm, described in section 2.2.8, two distinct
word lists were extracted. The words with the highest TF-IDF score, i.e. the most
significant words for each class are stored. For the phishing class of emails the top 20
words were extracted, whereas for the ordinary emails the top 100 words were defined.
All words present both in the phishing and the ordinary word lists were removed from
the phishing word list. This way only the most characteristic words for phishing emails
were kept. A maximum limit of 15 words was imposed in the algorithm, because it
was concluded empirically that the TF-IDF scores for more words has a low frequency
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presence in the corpus. However, this is a hyper parameter of the algorithm that needs
to be adjusted when applied to different datasets.
To ensure that the extracted words are actually relevant, a fine tuning process was
implemented to filter out from the list words that appear in less than 3% of the total
number of emails.
The sequence of steps of the TF-IDF-based algorithm for keyword list selection is
schematically presented in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: TF-IDF-based algorithm for keyword list feature selection
Each email was considered as a sample, and every sample went through an in-
formation extraction process. Some emails had HTML content, for these cases the
files were opened and parsed with Beautiful Soup[42], a Python package for HTML
parsing. All HREF tags were listed, giving all URLs contained within an email. The
relevant information for each URL was extracted and temporarily saved. After this,
the information was combined. First the number of links, then the number of different
domains, the average number of subdomains, the existence of specific characters, average
number of dots, average length and finally the length of the longest URL. Moving away
from URLs, the existence of forms or scripts is asserted. If the email was not HTML
formated the values of the related features were set to "0".
The next step was to parse the email with an email parser. Most emails were
encoded with MIME. The Python package email [43] was used to parse and extract
information regarding the fields of the emails, namely the date, sender details, and
body (the message itself). Starting with the date, Dateparser [44] was used to transform
the date from human readable text to datetime format[45], making it easier for further
calculations to be applied. The features related to the date are now obtained, where
the working hours are defined by the time between eight o’clock in the morning (8am)
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and six o’clock in the afternoon (6pm), and the weekend is defined by Saturday and
Sunday.
Finally, the content of the email is extracted. This last element contains the message
sent itself, it can be in plain text or in HTML format, with or without images. A MIME
decoding process is applied here.
With the content extracted, the word related features can be obtained. When the
similarity between words does not need to be exact, the package Fuzzywuzzy[46] was
used for approximate matching.
All features are stored in a list and saved in a CSV file. The file entries are then
randomized and split into two distinct datasets, one for training, and another for testing.
Each feature in the training dataset is normalized with a Min/Max scaler, where the
minimum is zero and the maximum one. The testing dataset is normalized with the
scale used to normalize the training data.
The email corpus preprocessing and feature extraction process is schematically
represented in figure 3.2. The implemented code is in Python 2.7 in order to be able
to use the more comprehensive library of relevant functions compared to the new
version of Python 3.6. The computer system that produced the results presented in
this thesis, had the Ubuntu 16.04 as operating system, 12 gigabytes of Random-Access
Memory (RAM) and a Central Processing Unit (CPU) with wight cores of model
Intel R©CoreTMi7-4720HQ and clock rate of 2.60GHz.
With the computational system used the training time for models is considerably low,
of at most one second, as the developed process is computationally efficient. Because
of this no times are explicit in this thesis, as they could be ignored for not being a
requirement imposed by E-goi nor do they present high enough values to justify any
further timing optimizations.
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Figure 3.2: Email corpus preprocessing and feature extraction process. Feature numbers
corresponds to Feature structure 2 (section 3.3.2)
3.4 Feature Visualization and Statistical Analysis
In order to evaluate the discrimination capacity of the individual features, in this section
their class distribution was analysed through histogram visualization. Features from
the Mixed binary and real value features, i.e Feature structure 2 described in section
3.3.2, were analyzed. Only the values from the training subset were counted in the
histograms before normalization to 0-1 range. The Seaborn [47] library was used to for
this statistical visualization. In the figures, label "0" and the green color refer to the
ordinary email feature distribution, and label "1" and the red color correspond to the
phishing emails feature distribution.
First, the URLs related features were analyzed. It was found that links in the emails
are rare, and when they exist they are mostly from phishing emails. This fact makes the
link related features relatively useful signature for phishing detection, as the classifier
will find that any email with one or more links is more likely to be a phishing attack.
However, since links appear rarely in the emails, the URLs related features are
not enough to solve the problem. This features are the n_links (figure 3.3), the
n_domain (figure 3.4), the n_subdomain (figure 3.5), the n_dots (figure 3.6) and
the length (figure 3.7).
The histogram visualization of the following features: the ip_at_minus (figure
3.8), the form_script_html (figure 3.9), the Kwords_subject (figure 3.10) and
the max_len_url (figure 3.11), has shown that in most of the cases these features
are not present in the emails (they have value 0) or have the same distribution for both
classes. These results were not expected taking into account that the same features are
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Figure 3.3: Histogram n_links. Figure 3.4: Histogram for n_domain.
Figure 3.5: Histogram for n_subdomain. Figure 3.6: Histogram for n_dots.
Figure 3.7: Histogram for length.
often suggested in the literature.
Similar to the link related features, the histograms of the Kwords_name_fuzzy
(figure 3.12), the set4 (figure 3.13), the set6 (figure 3.14) and the week_day (figure
3.15 show clear distinction between the class distributions.
Overall, if a feature from this group has value equal or bigger than one most probably
the email is a phishing one. Note that, while the link related features appear rarely in
the emails, these features are typically not null in phishing class of emails. Therefore,
35
Figure 3.8: Histogram for ip_at_minus. Figure 3.9: Histogram forform_script_html.
Figure 3.10: Histogram for
Kwords_subject. Figure 3.11: Histogram for max_len_url.
their discrimination capacity is stronger.
Figure 3.12: Histogram for
Kwords_name_fuzzy. Figure 3.13: Histogram for set4.
In contrast to the previous group of features, the following subset,
Kwords_name_exact (figure 3.16), set1 (figure 3.17), set2 (figure 3.18), set3
(figure 3.19), set5 (figure 3.20) and working_hour (figure 3.21) present ambiguous
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Figure 3.14: Histogram for set6. Figure 3.15: Histogram for week_day.
class distributions. Through observation it is not possible to make conclusions about
their discrimination quality.
Figure 3.16: Histogram for
Kwords_name_exact. Figure 3.17: Histogram for set1.
Figure 3.18: Histogram for set2. Figure 3.19: Histogram for set3.
The features obtained through the TF-IDF algorithm were considered separately,
with an automated selection process. With the training dataset the 15 most significant
words, obtained after subtraction of common significant words for both classes, were
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Figure 3.20: Histogram for set5.
Figure 3.21: Histogram for working_hour.
"mainly", "meant", "media", "million", "modalities", "bank", "background", "murdered",
"need", "whites", "operating", "opportunities", "options", "particularly" and "partnership".
The final list of actually used features was obtained after selection of the words that
appear in more that 3% of the emails. These were "bank", "media", "million", "modalities",
"need" and "partnership". The class distribution of the TF-IDF related features is shown
on figures from 3.22 to 3.27.
Figure 3.22: Histogram for the word
"bank".
Figure 3.23: Histogram for the word "me-
dia".
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Figure 3.24: Histogram for the word "mil-
lion".
Figure 3.25: Histogram for the word
"modalities".
Figure 3.26: Histogram for the word "need". Figure 3.27: Histogram for the word "part-nership".
3.5 E-mail classification
The process of choosing the most appropriate e-mail classification model is detailed in
section 3.5.1. Among various models comparatively studied, the Random Forest (RF)
prove to have the best discrimination properties. The optimal parameters of RF model
were tuned in section 3.5.2.
3.5.1 Classification Models
The classification models studied were Logistic Regression, K-NN, SVM, Decision
Tree (DT), RF, and Boosted Trees. Their choice is motivated by the analysis of the
state of the art. In many of the previous works tree based models were suggested as
classifiers for solving related problems, K-NN and SVM are among the most widely
applied machine learning classifiers in diverse applications. The optimized structure
of the classifiers was obtained after tuning their most sensitive hyper parameters with
training subset of the features.
The performance of the K-NN classifier in terms of Mean Square Error (MSE) was
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analyzed varying the number of neighbors K in the range of 1, 50. The results are
graphically represented in figure 3.28. K = 6 was determined as the optimal value.
Figure 3.28: K-NN model (variation of K)
The performance of the DT model was analyzed varying the maximum depth of the
tree in the range of 1 , 50. The MSE results are depicted in figure 3.29, the optimal
value of the maximum depth was determined as 9.
The MSE rate of the RF classifier varying the number of estimators in the range of
1, 500 is shown in figure 3.30. The optimal number of trees in the ensemble was defined
as 150.
The MSE rate of the Boosted Trees model varying the number of estimators in the
range of 1, 500 is shown in figure 3.31. The optimal number of trees was found to be 80.
SVM models with Radial Basis Function (RBF), linear, sigmoid and polynomial
kernels were studied. The comparative results of 5-folds cross-validation between SVM
(4 models), K-NN, RF, DT and Boosted Trees classifiers are summarized in Table 3.1.
For K-NN, RF, DT and Boosted Trees models the optimized configurations (discussed
above) are considered. Typically the phishing detection datasets are unbalanced,
normally the phishing emails are much less than the regular emails, therefore besides
the accuracy, the precision, recall and F1 score are useful performance metrics. F1
score is a particularly valuable performance indicator as it underlies the percentage of
correctly predicted phishing emails.
Table 3.1 shows that the SVM models with linear and RBF kernel functions are
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Figure 3.29: DT model (variation of maximum depth)
Figure 3.30: RF model (variation of maximum depth)
more reliable classifiers than SVM with polynomial and sigmoid kernels. However, the
performance metrics clearly suggest that the tree based models (RF, DT and Boosted
Trees) outperform the other classifiers. These results are in accordance to the reviewed
literature.
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Figure 3.31: Variation of maximum depth on the training data with decision tree model.
Random Forest model is the winner in this competition, closely followed by the
Boosted Trees. A potential problem with the RF model and in general with the tree
based ensemble models might be the training time due to the high number of trees.
However, this problem can be managed if the dataset is not extremely large, which
is the case in the present work. Based on this analysis and taking into account that
Boosted Trees is a more complex model to build, the RF classifier was selected to be
further tuned and applied for the phishing detection task.
In addition to this study on the Feature Structure 2, and to evaluate the difference
in performance between the Feature Structure 1 and Feature Structure 2, the same
model configurations were trained with a dataset with features related to the Feature
Structure 1. This yield somewhat worse results and proves that Feature Structure 2
is the most suited solution for this specific phishing problem, as shown in table 3.2.
It is also possible to observe that the best performing algorithm was Random Forest,
confirming it as the most suited classification model.
Due to the lack of sufficient phishing samples in the E-goi dataset Outlier detection
approach, described in [17], was studied. The idea was to teach the model what a
regular email is, and then the emails that appear to be somehow different would be
considered as phishing ones. Four models were tested.
i One Class SVM, an unsupervised Outlier detection SVM, where the training data
do not contain any phishing email (pure data). The other algorithms were allowed
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Table 3.1: Performance indicators of 5-fold cross-validation for Feature Structure 2
Accuracy (%) F1 Score (%) Precision (%) Recall (%)
Linear Regression 91.80 88.27 92.15 84.71
SVM
(Linear Kernel) 91.21 87.35 91.83 83.30
SVM
(Polynomial Kernel) 66.53 17.18 87.35 9.53
SVM
(RBF Kernel) 90.96 87.02 91.22 83.20
SVM
(Sigmoid Kernel) 87.66 80.47 94.92 69.86
K-NN (K = 6) 93.10 90.24 93.09 87.57
Random Forest
(150 Decision Trees) 95.23 93.41 94.13 92.70
Decision Tree
(max depth = 9) 94.10 91.74 93.65 89.90
Boosted Trees
(80 Decision Trees) 94.23 91.89 94.02 89.87
Table 3.2: Performance indicators of 5-fold cross-validation for Feature Structure 1
Accuracy (%) F1 Score (%) Precision (%) Recall (%)
Linear Regression 93.05 90.21 92.17 88.33
SVM
(Linear Kernel) 92.44 89.52 89.95 89.12
SVM
(Polynomial Kernel) 90.42 85.60 93.99 78.60
SVM
(RBF Kernel) 93.04 90.14 92.57 87.86
SVM
(Sigmoid Kernel) 91.94 88.51 91.49 85.74
K-NN (K = 6) 92.54 89.23 93.60 85.27
Random Forest
(150 Decision Trees) 93.67 91.14 92.48 89.85
Decision Tree
(max depth = 9) 93.40 90.69 92.81 88.68
Boosted Trees
(80 Decision Trees) 93.00 90.17 91.88 88.52
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to be polluted, with a parameter set to define the pollution percentile.
ii Elliptic Envelope, based on Gaussian distribution.
iii Isolation Forest, based on Random Forest algorithms, with the objective of isolating
samples that diverge from regular occurrences.
iv Local Outlier Factor, based on the K-NN algorithm, where each sample is given a
score according to its distance to other neighboring samples.
These algorithms were not able to reliably detect phishing emails in the E-goi dataset.
They produced a high number of false negatives, considering the phishing emails as
very similar to the regular ones, and therefore the Outlier approach was abandoned for
further study in this thesis.
3.5.2 Building Random Forest optimal configuration
The optimal configuration of the RF model was obtained varying three major hyper
parameters:
i max_features - maximum number of features to be considered when creating a new
branch of a tree. Two cases were studied: all features and the square root of all
features.
ii n_estimators - number of estimators, i.e. number of decision trees in the ensemble.
A wide range of 1, 3000 estimators was studied.
iii max_depth - maximum depth that a tree can reach, i.e. the length between the leaf
nodes and the root node cannot exceed this value. A range of 1, 25 tree depth was
studied.
The RF models were tuned when provided with different features extracted from
the Feature structure 2 (combination of binary and real value features), described in
section 3.3.2. The sequence of steps of the TF-IDF-based algorithm for keyword list
selection is schematically presented in figure 3.1. The final list of selected keywords is
"bank", "media", "million", "modalities", "need" , "partnership".
Four sub-sets were built and considered in the experiments.
1. Feature set 1 - 25 features (complete Feature structure 2).
2. Feature set 2 - 21 features (features with lower weight were removed).
3. Feature set 3 - 10 features (features with a clear discrimination between classes
were kept).
4. Feature set 4 - 19 features (TF-IDF-based features were removed).
The features that integrate each feature set are summarized in Table 3.3
The performance of the Random Forest model for different parameters that define
its structure is evaluated by the Out-Of-Bag (OOB) error. OOB error is a widely used
performance indicator for tree based classifiers. Each tree is trained with a bag of
randomly chosen samples from the feature set and then is tested with samples not used
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Table 3.3: Features considered in each feature set.
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Feature set 1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Feature set 2 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Feature set 3 x x x x x
Feature set 4 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
for training (out-of-bag samples). The OOB error is the average of the errors of all
trees with their respective out-of-bag samples.
During the experiments, first the optimal number of trees was determined
(n_estimators), which is the most important parameter of the RF model. Next,
the optimal max_depth parameter was determined through experiments where the RF
model has the optimal number of trees defined at the previous step.
The results of the OOB errors are graphically presented where on each plot are
depicted two curves corresponding to the two cases of the max_features parameter,
namely all features and sqrt(all features). For example from figure 3.32, one can conclude
that the optimal configuration of the RF model is with 400 trees and with maximum of
5 features to be considered when creating a new branch of a tree. The OOB error for
this configuration is 4.7%. The model was trained with the complete feature set of 25
mixed binary and real value features. Adding more estimators increases the OOB error
that suggests overfitting problem.
In the next experiment we tuned the max_depth parameter for a RF model with
400 trees (defined at the previous step). The results are summarized in figure 3.33.
Combining now the results of the two experiments we can define the final structure of
the RF model as 400 trees, 5 max_features and maximum depth of 20. The OOB error
of this model is 4.6%.
The next set of experiments were performed with Feature set 2 (21 features), where
features with less importance were removed. The removed features are those that in
the statistical analysis based on histogram visualization revealed to have overlapping
class distribution (see section 3.4).
The same approach was followed, as with the Feature Set 1, tuning first the number
of estimators and then the max_depth parameter. Taking into account the dimension
of the feature set the values of the max_features parameter are now set to 21 and 5.
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Figure 3.32: OOB error for Feature set 1, varying n_estimators parame-
ter
Figure 3.33: OOB error for Feature set 1, varying max_depth parameter
The results are plotted in figure 3.34 and figure 3.35. The optimal configuration of the
RF classifier was defined as 900 trees, maximum depth of 16 and max_features of 5.
The OOB error of this model is 4.4%. Increasing the number of trees did not bring
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advantages. The experiments with Feature set 2 confirmed that the excluded features
does not contribute indeed to the class discrimination. On the contrary, a slightly lower
OOB error was achieved with the reduced feature set.
Figure 3.34: OOB error for Feature set 2, varying n_estimators parame-
ter
The third set of experiments were performed with Feature set 3 (10 features), where
only the features found to have a clear discrimination between classes were kept. All
link related features (typically suggested in the literature) and word sets (set1, set2,
set3, set5) considered as less important during the statistical analysis were removed.
The results are plotted in figure 3.36.
For both values (3 and 10) of the max_features the OOB errors are higher than
with the previously used feature sets. The minimum error achieved was 6.5%. These
results prove that Feature set 3 lacks information and is therefore less appropriate for
phishing detection problem. No further studies over this set were done.
Similar results were obtained when the RF model was trained with Feature set 4,
where the TF-IDF-based features were removed. Figure 3.37 shows that this is the
worst set of features, with minimum OOB errors of 8.8%. No further studies over this
set were done.
The performance achieved by the optimal RF configurations obtained by the four
set of experiments are summarized in Table 3.4.
After careful consideration, it is possible to assert that Feature set 2 provides the
best mixture of binary and real value features combining email meta data, such as date
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Figure 3.35: OOB error for Feature set 2, varying max_depth parameter
Figure 3.36: OOB error for Feature set 3, varying n_estimators parame-
ter
and links, and bag of words data extracted from the email content.
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Figure 3.37: OOB error for Feature set 4, varying n_estimators parame-
ter
Table 3.4: Random Forest optimal parameters and performance results (OOB error) of
Configurations 1 and 2.
Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 Configuration 4
Feature Set Feature Set 1 Feature Set 2 Feature Set 3 FeatureSet 4
n_estimators 400 900 2000 400
max_depth 20 16 No Limit No Limit
max_features 5 5 3 4
OOB error 4.6% 4.4% 6.5% 8.8%
3.6 Random Forrest generalization performance
After the exhaustive search for the most appropriate feature set and the optimal
classifier detailed in the previous sections, in this section the generalization capacity of
Configuration 1 and Configuration 2 models is studied. The two RF models are faced
with the test set of emails not used in the previous experiments. 20% from the total
email data were randomly chosen and stored apart at the beginning of the project. The
results are presented in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.
Note that the performance indicator Accuracy is higher than the F1 score. This is
an expected result due to the availability of more regular email samples than phishing
ones (unbalanced data). This suggests that the classifier learned to recognize better
what a regular email is than a phishing email, therefore the F1 score is lower. The
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Table 3.5: Generalization performance indicators for Configuration 1 and 2
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Accuracy (%) 95.37 98.63
F1 Score (%) 93.24 97.99
Precision (%) 94.57 99.32
Recall (%) 91.95 96.70
Table 3.6: Confusion Matrix of Configuration 1 with test data
Predicted Outcome
Phishing Regular
Actual
Value
Phishing TP: 697 FN: 61
Regular FP: 40 TN: 1385
Table 3.7: Confusion Matrix of Configuration 2 with test data
Predicted Outcome
Phishing Regular
Actual
Value
Phishing TP: 733 FN: 25
Regular FP: 5 TN: 1420
Configuration 2 outperforms Configuration1 with respect to all performance metrics
(accuracy, F1 score, precision, recall). Additionally, figures 3.38 and 3.39 (zoomed
version for better visualization) show the ROC curves regarding the two configurations.
Based on all performance results we can safely recommend Configuration 2 as the
most trustful classifier, among the ones studied, with good generalization properties
regarding both classes.
The final experiment aims to study the effect of the number of training examples on
the classifier accuracy. The results are plotted in figure 3.40.
As it is expected, more training examples will decrease the gap between training
and cross-validation accuracy. Getting more training examples may worsen the classifier
accuracy on the training data however it will improve its generalization properties.
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Figure 3.38: ROC curve for Configuration 1 and Configuration 2.
Figure 3.39: Zoomed ROC curve for Configuration 1 and Configuration 2
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Figure 3.40: Learning curve of RF model.
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CHAPTER 4
Email Labeling Web Tool
It was agreed with E-goi that there was a need for the collection of data, and consecutive
labeling. For this purpose a web tool was developed. Its objective was to create an easy
to use platform to label the marketing campaigns in the form of emails, so that a more
conclusive study on the data can be in the future.
The developed tool is meant to be used exclusively used by workers of E-goi with
enough experience to correctly differentiate phishing emails from regular ones.
In order for this tool to function correctly, an external service must be feeding the
system with additional unlabeled emails, when available. In the systems of E-goi the
incoming advertising emails are processed and sent to different services, it is at this
point of the processing of emails that they should be copied into the assigned directory
for unlabeled emails.
4.1 Back End
This tool runs with a Python microframework with the name of Flask [48] and creates
the actual web pages with simple HTML files, where some JavaScript was applied.
This tool has a feature that offers an advice on the classification of emails. This is
possible with a machine learning model that is trained on the background. Users might
use this features to help them classify unlabeled emails.
Upon starting the service, if a model is not already available for classifying the
data, a new model is trained with the already labeled data. This trained model is not
supposed to be final, it only has representative value. It gives a rough estimate of how
the model will react to the available data.
The algorithm uses whatever data is labeled to train the models, going up to a
maximum of 4000 emails. The sub set of emails used is created automatically and is
always balanced, meaning that the amount of phishing emails is always the same as
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the regular emails. This is to prevent the cases where the dataset would become too
unbalanced.
From each email, the extracted features are the ones described in section 3.3.3.
Then, the data is fed to a grid-search algorithm from Scikit-learn [17], where the best
parameters of a random forest classifier are exhaustively searched through a grid of
values. This grid consists of a set of predefined values for each parameter to be tested.
The machine learning model used was Random Forest and the parameters that were
tested with the grid search were the maximum depth of the trees (of values 5,10,20,30),
the number of estimators (of values 35,50,75,100) and the minimum samples a leaf node
can have (of values 10, 15, 20). It is worth mention that during development of this
advising feature for the web tool the conclusions and results obtained from this thesis
had not been yet obtained, as this tool had to be ready and working on a considerably
earlier date, so the parameters and their values are somewhat different from the work
described in chapter 3.
Some dimensionality reduction algorithms are also tested, such as Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) and SelectKBest. PCA is an algorithm that tries transform a set
of variables thought to be related into a smaller set of variables, reducing the complexity
of the information [49]. PCA reduced the total number of features to 4, 9, 14, 19, 24.
SelectKBest algorithm selects only the K features with the most weight, where the
wight is measured through a score function (which was the Chi-squared distribution),
and K is 10.
Every combination of parameters in the grid search is validated with cross validation
of 5 folds. In the end, the combination of dimensionality reduction algorithms and
machine learning models that yield the best scores would actually be used for predictions.
This training process can be triggered by users with the button "Update Classifier" on
the "AI Management" page.
Emails are files with the Electronic Mail (EML) extension and are located in a
specific directory. All unlabeled emails are placed in an dedicated directory. When a
label is assigned to an email, it is its correspondent file is moved to the directory that
contains all emails with the same label. The labels can be of Phishing, meaning that the
email is malicious, and can be OK, implying they are harmless. An additional option
to Ignored exists for the cases where none of the previous labels accurately describes
the email, or if the email is not correctly formated.
The tool can handle several users classifying emails. Each user, with their own
browser, is given a random email to classify. If, by chance, one email is being classified
by more than one user, the only recorded answer is the first to be submitted.
Figure 4.1 is a diagram that shows how the mails are processed.
54
Figure 4.1: Dataset creation.
4.2 Front End
This tool consists in a few web pages. Namely the "Label-Ishing" page (which is the
home page), one for labeling the data named "Classify Emails", one for evaluating
results and managing the model named "AI Management", and a last one when there
are no more emails to classify.
The first page that shows when accessing this tool is the home page, shown in
figure 4.2. A simplistic design was chosen, where a top bar is always present for easy
navigation. Users can switch between the home page, the email classification page and
the machine learning and results page with a simple press of a button.
Figure 4.2: Web tool home page.
Upon pressing the "Classify emails" button, the user is redirected to the classification
page, shown in figure 4.3. In this page the user is shown one random unlabeled email,
and four different actions can be performed.
• Show images - Some emails contain images that are loaded from sources. To
prevent cases where the attackers might be tracking whoever loads them, all
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images are stripped from unlabeled emails. If they are actually necessary for the
classification of an email, the user can press the "Show Images" button to load
them.
• Phishing email - when a user identifies an email as being phishing, the button
"Phishing" should be pressed to assign that label to it.
• Ordinary email - when a user identifies an email as regular, or ordinary, the button
"Ordinary" should be pressed to assign that label to it.
• Ignore email - if the email does not fall into any previous category, or if it has
a bad format or is in a strange language, the user has the option to ignore the
email by simply pressing the "Ignore" button.
The figure also shows how the information regarding the emails is presented. The email
used to show the functionalities is not from clients of E-goi, as no authorization was
given for this purpose. This disclaimer is only referring to this representation, the
working website uses real data.
Figure 4.3: Web tool webpage for labeling emails.
Users presented with the email classification page have four distinct buttons available.
The first, "Show Images", has the purpose of showing images. As default, no images
contained within emails are shown, as they are usually obtained through access to the
sender website. As explained above, if a shown email is of phishing and it does contains
an image, it is not advisable to load them, as the attacker’s website might be able to
record some information of the machine that accessed it. This button allows users to
load the images at their own risk.
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The three other buttons, the "Ignore", "Ordinary" and "Phishing", have the purpose
of labeling the data. Upon pressing one of these, the file correspondent to the shown
email is moved from the unlabeled emails directory to directory correspondent to the
label assigned to it, as described in section 4.1.
Some additional information is also available. This includes a label showing the
amount of unlabeled emails, and another label that shows how the currently trained
machine learning model classifies the email that is presented to the user, as well as its
certainty. This last label is the content described by the text "Model classifies as:" in
figure 4.3.
Lastly, the relevant information that is extracted from the email file is shown to
the user in a table. This information includes the name of the file itself, some details
about the client of E-goi that sent the email, such as the name, email, ID and client
registration date, the send date, the subject and the content itself.
Figure 4.4 shows the "AI Management" webpage for machine learning model man-
agement and results visualization. On the left of the figure, the confusion matrix and
some score metrics are shown. These results are relative to how the active prediction
model predicts the label of an email and the actual label given to the same email. The
values presented are the accumulation of all labeled emails since the last model update.
When the "Update Classifier" button is pressed, the classifier is retrained and all score
metrics are reset to zero. On the right of the figure, a count of the emails in each
correspondent directory is presented, giving a rough estimate of the labeling progress
up to that point.
Also, the "Set Threshold" button updates the certainty threshold value to which the
classifier will consider itself in doubt. As previously explained, there is a feature that
automatically gives an advice on the class of unlabeled emails, this advice consists on
the certainty percentile of the prediction model for the most probable outcome. The
threshold is an assigned value that defines the certainty of the model, if the predicted
probability for a class is higher than the threshold then the certainty is considered high,
but if it is lower, the prediction is "uncertain".
When the user tries to classify a new email and there are no more emails to classify,
the user is redirected to a page informing the user about this fact. This page is shown
in figure 4.5.
In figure 4.6 a diagram demonstrating the possible actions with the developed tool
is visible. This describes the processes executed upon the start of the application and
the processes triggered by users when using it.
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Figure 4.4: Web tool webpage for machine learning model management and results visual-
ization.
Figure 4.5: Web tool webpage for when there are no more emails to classify.
Figure 4.6: Diagram of executable processes.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Future Work
The goal of this master thesis was to develop an intelligent tool to filter out the phishing
emails based on machine learning methods, for the Portuguese multichannel marketing
automation company E-goi. On a regular day, E-goi receives hundreds of marketing
email campaigns and redirects them to a list of clients. Some of these campaigns are
attacks that intend to steal user information from the end clients such as bank accounts,
private data, personal logins and identity, etc. The company personnel need to go
through all emails to find and block these attacks. This is a very time demanding and
not scalable way to do the job. The proposed system aims to reduce the workload by
automatically flagging phishing emails.
A relevant dataset, including around 7000 regular and 4000 phishing emails, was
created from two online available email data sets containing emails from the two types:
phishing and ordinary.
The first contribution of this work was the selection of the most appropriate features
to discriminate between ordinary and phishing emails. A number of features were
extracted from the emails, such as related to the links and the correspondent URLs, the
presence of HTML, scripts or form in the email body, the send date and hour, counting
specific word presence in the email, matching words between the client info and email
subject. Additionally, keywords (maximum of 15) matching the email body content are
obtained applying the text mining algorithm of name TF-IDF.
The second contribution is the proposed mechanism for phishing email detection.
Most state of the art phishing detection systems are based on URL analyze and the use
of outside resources, such as blacklists, whitelists or other Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs). The proposed configuration integrates the full content of the email
in the classification process, and is able to achieve competing results working only
locally, i.e. oﬄine, mainly due to the use of data mining techniques and the automatized
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extraction of features. The system is able to dynamically find the most relevant words
(features) from the email corpus and quickly adapt to new trends of phishing attacks.
After a comprehensive study of the relevance of different combinations of features,
two winning configurations were defined. Both of them use Random Forest ensemble
classifiers. The optimal configuration evolves 21 features, consists of 900 decision
trees, has a maximum tree depth of 16, and has a maximum number of features to be
considered when creation a new branch of the tree equal to 5. The performance of the
classification system achieved accuracy of 98.6% and F1 score of 98.0% with test data,
which is a very promising state of the art result.
The third contribution of the present thesis is the developed web tool for email
labeling. The web tool allows authorized personal of the company to label the emails
obtained from their real clients. This tool is expected to facilitate the implementation of
the phishing detection prototype in the company. It will feed continuously the dataset
and the classifier with new phishing examples, which was the major obstacle for not
being possible an immediate release of the developed prototype.
Future work will also involve retraining the classification model with dataset in
Portuguese and Spanish as they are the most frequently used languages within the
company’s clients. Currently the tool suggests training based on the whole accumulated
past data (which is still rather small), however at some point it will be necessary to limit
the past information only to some recent past window of emails. This will guarantee
the smooth adaptation to new attack trends.
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